Introduction
Universalization of health insurance has gained significant momentum in a number of developing countries, especially emerging market economies. In most instances, such reforms aim to improve both efficiency as well as equity outcomes of input-financed public health systems which coexisted with contributory social insurance schemes for those in -or linked to -the formal labor market. Inefficiencies often stemmed from lacking incentives and resources for providers to deliver health services where they were indeed needed; inequities arose due to the hidden out-of-pocket expenditures or absence of essential services so that the poorest, quite often, had to rely on costly private health services in emergency situations. Creation of such parallel, non-contributory health insurance schemes includes the definition of a basic package of health services to which those without formal social insurance coverage are entitled; the identification of the eligible population; the pricing of the package as well as individual service charges providers can claim; and the establishment of a reimbursement mechanisms for participating providers. This allows financing within the system to flow to providers where effective demand materializes. Countries that have introduced such non-contributory insurance schemes on a large scale in parallel to Bismarkian social insurance -and in which the two coexist -include, for example, Argentina (Plan Nacer), Chile (FONASA), Mexico (Seguro Popular) and Indonesia (Kartu Sehat) (Pradhan, Saadah et al. 2001; Bitrán and Giedion 2003; World Bank 2004; World Bank 2010) .
During the past decade, Turkey also expanded a similar program, the Yeşil Kart (Green Card) non-contributory insurance program. The program aimed to provide health services to the poor who were not covered through formal means of health insurance (Akdağ 2009 The stated aim of the program was to improve access and quality of essential health services for the uninsured, mostly poor. Apart from raising both the level and quality of care on aggregate, the very concept of insurance, with a defined bundle of inpatient and outpatient health services as well as prescription drugs, was to provide households with uninterrupted access to vital health services, including in times of household level income shocks. The Green Card program, which had started out as a stand-alone program with a separate budget and was the main flagship social protection program of the Turkish government in the past decade, was-as of January 2012-fully integrated into the Universal Health Insurance Scheme covering all Turkish citizens (under Law 3816).
This paper assesses the Green Card program along several dimensions. First, we look at who was reached by the massive coverage expansion between 2003 and 2008. Using repeated cross-section household survey date, we report both average and marginal incidence changes.
Second, we assess whether the program had a significant impact on improving the financial protection of households by lowering out-of-pocket expenditures which would have been both impoverishing as well as catastrophic in nature. Third, using a special household survey which was collected during the economic crisis in Turkey in 2008 and 2009, we evaluate whether the Green Card non-contributory health insurance program protected health care utilization during the economic crisis period during which households faced income shocks.
The structure of our paper is as follows: We start in Section 2 by providing information on the institutional set-up and targeting mechanism of the program. Section 3 describes the data used in this paper. Section 4 presents the results as to who benefited from the massive 
Institutional Background and Targeting Mechanism
The Green Card program, initially set up in 1992, was an important social protection mechanism, centrally financed through general revenues. Prior to 2002, the budget and coverage of the program had remained small (Yildirim and Yildirim 2011) The application process for the Green Card Program was administered by local committees at the district level.
1 The Green Card was distributed through a hybrid targeting scheme, combing community discretion with eligibility rules determined by the central government.
Applications were collected at the district level Green Card offices which usually reported directly to the centrally appointed district heads (kaymakams). The ultimate decisions on the distribution of the cards were made by local committees chaired by the kaymakam (in districts) and the deputy governor in charge of the Green Card in the province center. In a typical district with a population exceeding 50,000, the distribution of the cards looked like the following:
Step 1: The application process was handled through a Green Card service center. The onestop service center checked to see if the applicant was registered with any of the formal social security institutions (SSK, Emekli Sandigi or Bagkur prior to 2006 and SGK after 2006 2 ) or if the applicant owned a motor vehicle (ownership of a car prevented the applicant from obtaining a Green Card).
Step 2: The total income of the household was approximated by adding the reported incomes of the individuals in the household to any estimated income from agricultural land holdings. the estimated income per capita was less than 1/3 of minimum wage (net of taxes), then the household members were deemed eligible for the Green Card.
Step 3: The local committee decided whether or not qualifying applicants (according to steps one and two above) were indeed to be admitted to the Green Card program. Even if the household was formally eligible, the committee was able to use its discretion not to provide the card if evaluated the person/s not as poor. The household members who qualified each obtained an individual green booklet which registered all interactions with the health system.
This hybrid targeting mechanism, combining central criteria with local knowledge and assessment, resulted in a progressive roll-out of the program during expansion.
Data and Variables Used
We use two main data sources in our Green Card assessment: the Turkey Household Budget Surveys (HBS) from six consequent years (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) in the survey, it is hence possible to track the health utilization behavior of various types of households through the creation of a quasi-panel. 5 The survey distinguishes between the reduction in curative and preventative care services.
Further, we construct a wealth variable at the household level using the TWMS. The asset index constructed for this purpose is based on housing characteristics and household durable goods following (Filmer and Pritchett 2001) . We use the asset index to derive both wealth deciles as well as wealth quintiles of the urban sample. 
Expansion of the Program: Targeting and Coverage
The If we compare Green Card households to those households without any insurance coverage, we observe a small difference in the share of total expenditures allocated to health in 2008.
Households with a head holding a Green Card in 2008 spent on average 1.6 percent of total expenditures and 2.7 percent of non-food expenditures on health, while those households with no insurance spent 2.1 percent of total and 2.9 percent of non-food expenditures on outof-pocket health expenditures.
The difference in spending in terms of percentage of household expenditures between the two groups is 0.45 percent of total household expenditures. While this difference is statistically significant for the overall sample (at the 95 percent confidence level), it is not statistically significant when restricted to the poorest quintile. Welch test results for this hypothesis test are provided in Table 2 . For the poorest households --which already had low levels of health expenditures (also depicted in Figure 3 ) -we do not observe a lower level of health expenditures for Green Card holders compared to those without.
Similarly, we also estimate the additional protective impact of the Green Card against impoverishing health expenditures to have been relatively modest. Health expenditures can have an impoverishing impact if near-poor households have to switch away from buying other necessary goods in order to cover urgent health costs. A near-poor household that covers health expenditures and therefore has to reduce spending on food would then become a poor household in terms of its living standards (O'Donnell et al. 2004 ). In Turkey, national poverty measures are calculated using a consumption basket that includes health spending.
With health expenditures included in household nominal expenditures, a household that might be poor without health expenditures may record non-poor levels of expenditures if we include health spending. Lastly, we examine the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures. These are defined as the share of total expenditures dedicated to health above a certain threshold level (Xu et al. 7 We apply the following calculation to assess the impoverishing impact of health spending: Given published poverty rates by TURKSTAT at the national level, we derive poverty lines endogenously for each HBS year, using nominal expenditures (as the publically available household surveys do not include geographic identifiers which would have allowed for a computation of regional poverty lines and the derivation of real consumption expenditures). Those households above the poverty line are marked as non-poor (including health expenditures). We then create a new poverty line that does not include health expenditures and assess the poverty status of each household not including health expenditures. The impoverishing impact of health spending is the percentage of individuals who were poor without health expenditures (when compared to the poverty line net of health expenditures) but were non-poor when full expenditures are compared to the full poverty line (including health expenditures). 8 The poverty line is adjusted by subtracting the average health expenditures of the poorest three deciles from the poverty line. The poverty line shifts from the 27 th percentile in 2003 to the 17 th percentile in 2008, hence we pick the bottom 3 deciles as an approximation for the deciles around the poverty line across this time period. 2007). We apply different threshold levels for catastrophic payments on health care varying between 5 and 25 percent of total household expenditures and between 15 and 40 percent of non-food expenditures of the household. We calculate both the incidence and the mean gap of catastrophic health care spending at these difference thresholds (Table 4) . One dimension of the expansion of the insurance scheme which we were, due to the lack of data, not able to look at during the period of expansion, from 2003 to 2008, concerns the actual utilization of health services which can very well be the major dimension of welfare improvement for beneficiaries. We are able, though, to look at the impact of the program on health care utilization during the recent economic downturn which we turn to in the next section.
Protective Impact of the Green Card during the 2008-2009 Economic Downturn
In this Section, we make use of the Turkey Welfare Monitoring Survey (TWMS) to assess whether the Green Card had a protective impact for its beneficiaries during the recent economic downturn. Our hypothesis is that the Green Card did provide such protective impact by lowering the costs of both outpatient and inpatient care. If true, we would find Green Card holders to have reduced health consumption less than non-beneficiaries (of any insurance program). The analysis in this Section, hence, compares the health care utilization behavior of Green Card holding households with households with no insurance coverage. The counterfactual in the analysis therefore is households that did not have access to any form of health insurance (whether through the Green Card, through SGK coverage or private insurance). We estimate the different behavior of households with access to the Green Card and with no health insurance throughout the crisis using three different estimation methods:
(i) a non-parametric technique, (ii) a parametric linear probability model (LPM) and maximum likelihood probit regressions; and (iii) propensity score matching.
When modeling the impact of a demand-side subsidy on health care utilization, we need to control for self-selection given that cardholders could have un-observable attributes which could be correlated with both program enrolment and the actual use of health services.
Simply comparing medical care use between program participants (the treatment group) and non-participants (the control group) could otherwise result in a biased estimate of the program's effect. With experimental data, this bias would not be present as the random assignment of individuals to each group would balance the observable and unobservable individual characteristics affecting health utilization.
In the absence of experimental data, we make use of retrospective questions included in the TWMS. The TWMS recorded households' health care utilization at the beginning (October 2008) of the crisis and at the time of data collection (June 2009). With such a quasi-panel, we can isolate household fixed effects by estimating the probability of change in health care utilization for each household during the crisis. Comparing the estimated reduction in the probabilities of health care utilization of Green Card holding households versus households with no insurance coverage, then allows us to assess the protective impact of the program. Table 5A provides summary statistics for household head characteristics with respect to insurance access, distinguishing Green card holders from those with access to the SGK (formal health insurance holders) and household heads not covered by any health insurance.
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Green Card holding household heads record, on average, less educational attainment and a higher likelihood of employment in the informal sector than other groups (note that the latter is one of the beneficiary selection criteria as discussed above). In Table 5B , the same variables are presented for the sample of households in the poorest asset quintile only. Here, the difference across insurance types by educational attainment is not as pronounced. The proportion of household heads employed in agriculture and industry are also roughly similar between Green Card holding households heads and those without any insurance. The only difference remains in the proportion of household heads formally employed with 4.3 percent of Green Card beneficiaries holding formal jobs and 21.1 percent of household heads without any insurance. This difference is a function of the eligibility criteria for the card and derives from the targeting process described above.
Non-parametric Estimation
We use three different estimation techniques with the TWMS to assess the protective impact of the Green Card program during the economic crisis in Turkey. We first employ the below non-parametric comparison between the group of households with access to the Green Card and those that have no health insurance coverage:
where G i is the treatment variable for having access to the Green Card in period t 1 ; H i is the variable for having access to other health insurance at the household level (through formal sector health insurance SGK or private insurance); and x is log income per capita in the Table 6 provides estimates of the probability of reducing utilization of curative care and preventive care for the whole sample and for the poorest per capita income quintile for those households that had access to the Green Card and those that did not have access to any insurance, respectively. For the group of household heads who had no access to health insurance, the probability of reducing utilization through this period was 36.6 percent while for Green Card holders the probability of such reduction was 21.7 percent. 11 Similarly, we observe a difference in the probability of utilization of preventive health care (in Panel B of same (1)) and the group of households with no health insurance coverage.
The non-parametric kernel estimation results are in line with the simple mean differences across the insurance groups (Table 6) . The x-axis in the Figure is log per capita income and the analyses is conducted at the household level. The difference in utilization probabilities is starkest among the poorer quintiles where the protective impact of the Green Card program was largest.
Parametric Estimation
By imposing a structure on the relationship between Green Card access ( ) and the change in utilization through the crisis period ( , we can estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) by using a parametric regression. The empirical specification for the parametric estimation in time t is :
11 The difference of 14.8 percentage points between the two groups is statistically significant (with a p-value< 0.01), using a Pearson Chi-2 test comparing two binomial distributions. The difference in equations for the two time-periods becomes:
The dependent variable is a binary variable in the dataset taking a value of 1 if the household reports having reduced health care utilization (of curative and preventive care respectively 
where E (
The coefficient measures the impact of the macro shock on the probability of reducing health care utilization. The coefficient is expected to have a positive value (with the macro shock being associated with a positive probability of reducing utilization of health care).
14 The coefficient can be interpreted as the protection provided by the Green Card stemming from the macro shock and is the coefficient for the protection provided to the household in the face of a household level income shock. Assuming selection on observables only, we can interpret the sum of these two coefficients as the average treatment effect of the Green Card, stemming from both a household level income shock as well as the macro impact.
In our baseline fixed-effects model, household characteristics drop out of the differenced equation. However, it is possible that household characteristics influence the change in utilization itself. In one variation, therefore, we retain such characteristics in the model:
In the estimation, the household characteristics (X i ) include: (i) the household asset index; (ii) the educational attainment level of the household head; and (iii) household demographic composition (number of children, adults and elderly in the household). All of these leaving the progam and some entering), we can reasonably assume that households which recorded accesss to the Green Card in May 2009 already had such access at the outset of the crisis in October 2008. 13 If this assumption is not true and a household in the sample received the Green Card in May 2009 (t 1 ) and not in t 0 , we would most likely underestimate the protective impact of the Green Card program as the actual reduction of the probability of reducing health services would have been higher if the protective impact of the Green Card program had been present throughout the period. In the reverse (households loosing access between t 0 and t 1 ), the effect would be the opposite. 14 Note that the question used in the survey for the change in health utilization questions are -Have you had to reduce visits to the doctor since Oct 2008?‖ and -Have you had to reduce your use of preventive health care services since Oct 2008?‖ Hence, both questions when answered positively involve a reduction in the utilization of health care in the time period t0 to t1. characteristics may potentially be correlated with not only the level of health care utilization and demand but also its changes which we are interested in here.
The regression results for model specifications without and with household characteristics are provided as a linear probability model (LPM) in Table 7 and a probit regression (reporting marginal effects) in Table 8 . We include separate estimation results for the reduction of curative and preventative health services separately.
In the LPM regressions reported in Table 7 , the sample is limited to households that either Households that had access to the Green Card were less likely to reduce utilization of curative care by 12.5 percentage points and preventive care by 15.8 percentage points compared to households with no insurance coverage. This is represented by the term in Equation (4) and can be interpreted as the interaction between the macro shock of the crisis and access to the Green Card at the household level. The interaction term between Green Card access and the household level idiosyncratic income shock does not reveal statistically significant coefficients ( 6 ) in these regressions. However, the average treatment effect on health care utilization (protective impact) of the Green Card among those households that received an income shock can be calculated as a combination of 3 and 6 coefficients in Equation 4. This protective impact of the Green Card can then be tested using a joint F-test of significance for 3 and 6 .The joint F-test is reported at the bottom of Table 7 and shows the significance of the Green Card protective impact results.
To provide robustness checks on the results provided above, we control for household characteristics ( ) as in Equation (5) allowing for a more flexible model whereby household characteristics may be associated with the change in health utilization differently in the two periods. The results of the LPM regression for the specification in Equation (5) are provided in The results on Green Card protective impact are robust to the addition of these household level characteristics, where the size of 3 remains negative and significant: minus 11.1 for curative care and minus 14.3 for preventive care with this specification. These regressions make it possible to analyze the change in health utilization behavior by household characteristics in this time period: we observe for instance that for increased values of the asset index (for wealthier households) the probability of reducing curative health care utilization is lower. Household demographics also matter in determining health care utilization through the crisis: in households where there are infants (ages 0-3), and where there are elderly people (ages 60+) the probability of reducing curative health care utilization is lower. For each additional infant in the household, the probability of reducing curative health care utilization drops by 9.7 percentage points, and for each elderly person added to a household the probability of reducing curative health care utilization drops by 8.7 percentage points.
For completeness, we also report the marginal effects from the probit regression with the specification in equation (4) in Table 8: 15 . Access to the Green Card at the household level is associated with a reduction in the probability of reducing visits to the doctor for preventive care by 12.7 percentage points and the probability of reducing utilization of health services for preventive care by 17.1 percentage points compared to households that have no access to health insurance (Table 8: The results using the linear probability model and the probit model with marginal effects both give similar conclusions that (i) access to the Green Card when interacted with the macro shock through the crisis (in ) is associated with a reduction in the probability of reducing health care utilization (both for preventive and curative care); (ii) the household level income shock is associated with a significant increase in the probability of reducing curative health care services but not preventative health care services ( ); and (iii) the interaction between the Green Card and the income shock at the household level, on its own, does not take on a significant coefficient ( ) but that the 3 and 6 coefficients are jointly significant in both models.
Propensity Score Matching
Lastly, we employ propensity score matching techniques for assessing the protective impact of the Green Card program on health care utilization through the Crisis. We first estimate each household's propensity to receive the binary treatment (of having the Green Card), using a probit or logit model, as a function of observable characteristics; and then match the treated and untreated households on the basis of this propensity score, to compare their differences in the outcome variable (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . We construct cells based on the propensity score, p(x), and compute the expected value of the outcome variable for the treated and untreated observations with the same (or similar) propensity scores (calculating in each cell) and then aggregate over all propensity score cells.
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The observations in the treatment and derived control group are comparable to each other since they are equally likely to be treated. Maintaining the selection on observables, the difference between the two observations gives the effect of the treatment for that particular value of the propensity score. Repeating this exercise over many values of the propensity score and then aggregating over the whole sample gives the average treatment effect (ATE).
We determine the propensity score using logit and probit regressions separately. The specification for the regressions determining the propensity score is provided in Table 6 .
Household characteristics (household size, composition, housing conditions and assets) as 16 The propensity score matching results are obtained using the psmatch2 package in STATA. Leuven and Sianesi (2003) .
well as the characteristics of the household head (gender, educational attainment and type of employment) are used as independent variables to determine the propensity score for accessing the Green Card.
We then match treated observations using four different matching techniques including (i) one-to-one matching, (ii) nearest neighbor matching, (iii) radius matching, and (iv) kernel matching. The size of the coefficient for the average treatment effect (ATE) is somewhat sensitive to the choice of matching technique. In one-to-one matching, a single control is used for each treatment observation (with replacement); in nearest-neighbor matching, the nearest 3 neighbors are selected as the control group; in radius matching, all untreated observations within a certain radius (in this case caliper 0.2) are included in the control group. Finally, in the kernel matching, we use multiple controls for each treatment, with a weight that declines with the distance from the treatment observation. The standard errors of the estimators are obtained using bootstrapping (with 500 repetitions in each scenario). In order to provide one further robustness check, the data is trimmed in certain scenarios to increase common support and the results of the trimmed sample scenarios are also provided in the results.
Using these different matching methods, Table 10 provides results for the change in utilization of preventive health care. The average treatment effect in these estimations varies between 12.8 percentage points and 17.8 percentage points depending on the matching technique, whether we use a logit or probit function for the determination of the propensity score, and whether we employed trimming or not. Table includes 
Conclusions
In this paper, we have assessed whether the Turkish Green Card program had a protective impact on beneficiary households during the 2000s -and this time period includes clearly ‗good' times for Turkey (from 2003 to 2008) as well as ‗bad' times when the country was impacted by the international financial crisis. While the available data sources do not allow us to examine the protective impact both through financial protection and safeguarding health care utilization in parallel, we were able to tease out these impacts separately for different time periods.
The analysis of household surveys indicates that in the period 2003-2008, the rapid roll-out and successful targeting of the Green Card scheme has increased the health insurance coverage of Turkey's poor. In the same time period, out-of-pocket health expenditures have also declined slightly, reducing the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures. However, observed small reductions in levels of out-of-pocket expenditures are not causally attributable to the expansion of the Green Card. Similarly, we found a very slight -and statistically not significant -decline in the impoverishing impact of health expenditures in connection with the roll-out of the program.
To assess the protective impact during the ‗bad' time, we use a unique household survey fielded during the financial crisis in Turkey to assess the impact of the Green Card in times of economic hardship. Three different methodologies are used to establish the impact of the Green Card on health care utilization during the crisis. Both non-parametric and parametric estimates using the Turkey Welfare Monitoring Survey establish that the Green Card program was an effective and functional safety net, protecting the health care utilization of the poor during the crisis period. Propensity score matching estimates and robustness checks using four different matching techniques -as well as trimming to increase common support --confirm that access to the Green Card was associated with a positive and significant impact on protecting the health care utilization of poor households through the beginning of the financial crisis. Per capita nominal expenditure deciles
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% of this decile covered by obligatory insurance % of this decile covered by the Green Card % of this decile covered by any kind of insurance (including the greencard) The dropped category in columns 1 and 3 are households where the household head does not have any form of health insurance. For Columns 2 and 4, the dropped category is households where the household head does not have health insurance and also does not have any formal educational training (is illiterate or has no formal diploma). 
